

Article

An Assessment of Deep Learning Models and Word Embeddings for Toxicity Detection within Online Textual Comments

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Abstract: Today, due to the explosion of online communication, more and more people are interacting online and a lot of textual comments are being produced. However, a paramount inconvenience within online environments is that comments that are shared within digital platforms can hide hazards such as fake news, insults, harassment, and, more in general, comments that may hurt someone's feelings. In this scenario, the detection of this kind of toxicity has an important role to moderate online communication. Recently, deep learning technologies delivered impressive performance within Natural Language Processing applications encompassing Sentiment Analysis and emotion detection across numerous datasets. Such models do not need any pre-defined hand-picked features, but they learn sophisticated features from the input datasets by themselves. In such a domain, word embeddings have been widely used as a way of representing words in Sentiment Analysis tasks proving to be very effective. Therefore, in this paper, we investigated the use of deep learning and word embeddings to detect six different types of toxicity within online comments. In doing so, the most suitable deep learning layers and state-of-the-art word embeddings to identify toxicity are evaluated. The results suggest that Long-Short Term Memory layers in combination with mimicked word embeddings are a good choice for this task.

Keywords: Deep Learning; Word Embeddings; Toxicity Detection; Binary Classification

1. Introduction

In these years, short text information is continuously being created due to the explosion of online communication, social networks, and e-commerce platforms. Through these systems, people can interact with each others, express opinions, engage in discussions, and receive feedback about any topic. However, a paramount inconvenience within online environments is that text spread by digital platforms can hide hazards such as fake news, insults, harassment, and, more in general, comments that may hurt someone's feeling. These comments can be considered as the digital version of personal attacks (e.g., bullying behaviors) that can cause social problems (e.g., racism), and are felt as dangerous and critical by people who are struggling to prevent and avoid them. [The risk of such a phenomenon has increased with the event of social networks and more in general within online communication platforms](#)¹. An attempt to deal with this issue is the introduction of crowdsourcing voting schemes

¹ <https://medium.com/analytics-vidhya/twitter-toxicity-detector-using-tensorflow-js-1140e5ab57ee>

28 which give the possibility to denounce inappropriate comments in online environments to the users.
29 Among many others, Facebook for example allows its users to report a post in terms of violence or hate
30 speech [1]. This scheme allows Facebook to identify fake accounts, offensive comments, etc. However,
31 these methodologies are often inefficient as they fail to detect toxic comments in real time [2], becoming
32 a requirement within social network communities. A toxic post might have been published online
33 much earlier than the time it is reported, and during the time it is online it might cause problems and
34 offenses to several users which might have undesired behaviors (e.g., leaving the underlying social
35 platform). Therefore, detecting toxicity within textual comments through novel technologies has great
36 relevance in the prevention of adverse social effects in a timely and appropriate manner within online
37 environments [3].

38 In the last years, the use of data for extracting meaningful information to interpret opinions and
39 sentiments of people about various topics has taken hold. Today, textual online data is parsed to
40 predict ratings about online courses [4], sentiments associated to companies and stocks within the
41 financial domain [5] and, recently, healthcare [6], toxicity in online platforms [7]. All these approaches
42 fall within the Sentiment Analysis research topic, which classifies data into positive or negative classes,
43 and includes several subtasks such as emotion detection, aspect-based polarity detection [8], etc. To
44 detect such knowledge, supervised Machine Learning-based systems are designed and provided by
45 the research community to support and improve online services to mine and use the information. To
46 employ supervised Machine Learning based tools, training data is required; however, the amount of
47 labeled data might result insufficient, thus making challenging the design of these tools.

48 This is more stressed with the spread of Neural Networks and deep learning models, which can
49 reproduce cognitive functions and mimic skills typically performed by the human brain, but need
50 large amount of data to be trained. With the elapse of time, the interest in these technologies as well as
51 their use for the identification of various kinds of toxicity within textual documents are grown [1].

52 Word embeddings are one of the cornerstones to represent textual data and feed Machine Learning
53 tools. They are representations of words mapped to vectors of real numbers. The first word embedding
54 model (Word2Vec) utilizing Neural Networks was published in 2013 [9] by researchers at Google.
55 Since then, word embeddings are encountered in almost every Natural Language Processing (NLP)
56 model used in practice today. The reason for such a mass adoption is their effectiveness. By translating
57 a word to an embedding it becomes possible to model the semantic importance of a word in a numeric
58 form and thus perform mathematical operations on it. In 2018, researchers at Google proposed
59 the Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (*BERT*) [10], a deeply bidirectional,
60 unsupervised language representation able to create word embeddings that represent the semantic of
61 words in the context they are used. On the contrary, context-free models (e.g, Word2Vec) generate a
62 single word embedding representation for each word in the vocabulary independently from the word
63 context.

64 Within this scenario, in this paper various deep learning models fed by word embeddings are
65 designed and evaluated to recognize toxicity levels within textual comments. In details, four deep
66 learning models built by using the Keras² framework are designed, and four different types of word
67 embeddings are analysed.

68 To this aim, the current state-of-the-art toxicity dataset released during the Kaggle challenge on
69 toxic comments³ is used.

70 The reader notices that this paper analyses the performances of deep learning and classical
71 Machine Learning approaches (using tf-idf and word embeddings) when tackling the task of toxicity
72 detection. Basically we want to assess whether the syntactic and semantic information lying within the
73 text can provide hints on the presence of certain toxicity classes. In some domains and tasks this is

² <https://keras.io/>

³ <https://www.kaggle.com/c/jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge/overview>

74 not possible: for example, for the problem of identifying empathetic VS non empathetic discussion
75 within answers of a therapist during motivational interviews it has been initially observed that
76 syntactic and semantic information do not provide any clue for the classification task leading to very
77 low accuracies [11]. Thus, for a fair analysis, it is important that the dataset does not contain any
78 unbalanceness. Machine Learning classifiers fail to cope with imbalanced training datasets as they are
79 sensitive to the proportions of the different classes [12]. As a consequence, these algorithms tend to
80 favor the class with the largest proportion of observations, which may lead to misleading accuracies.
81 That is why we preprocessed the mentioned dataset to make it balanced and then applied a 10-fold
82 cross-validation to tackle the proposed task.

83 Thus, this paper provides the following contributions:

- 84 • We analysed four deep learning models based on Dense, Convolutional Neural Network (CNN),
85 and Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) layers to detect various levels of toxicity within online
86 textual comments.
- 87 • We evaluate the use of four word embedding representations based on *Word2Vec* [13,14] and
88 Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformer (*BERT*) [15] algorithms for the task of
89 toxicity detection in online textual comments.
- 90 • We provide a comparison between deep learning models against common baselines used within
91 classification tasks of textual resources.
- 92 • We release contextual word embeddings resource trained on a dataset including toxic comments.
- 93 • We also release mimicked word embeddings of tokens that are missing in the pre-trained Google
94 *Word2Vec*⁴ word embeddings.

95 The source code used for this study is freely available through a GitHub repository⁵.

96 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a literature review and
97 discusses current methods for toxicity detection in textual resources. Section 3 formalizes the problem.
98 Section 4 describes the word embeddings and deep learning models adopted in this research work.
99 Research results and their discussion are reported in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper
100 and illustrates future directions to further tackle the detection of toxic comments.

101 2. Related Work

102 A few past works have already addressed the challenge of detecting toxicity within textual
103 comments left by users within online environments. Generally, they rely on Sentiment Analysis
104 methods [16–21] to detect and extract the subjective information and classify emotions and sentiments
105 to determine if a toxicity facet is present or not. For doing so, NLP, Machine Learning, Text Mining, and
106 Computational Linguistics are the most prominent technologies that are employed [22,23]. Sentiment
107 Analysis methods, like many others within the Machine Learning domain, can be mainly split into
108 two categories. i.e., supervised and unsupervised. Supervised techniques require the use of labeled
109 data (training set) to train a model that can be applied to unseen data to predict a sentiment or an
110 emotion [24–26]. These methods often are limited by the lack of labeled data, or by the fact that there are
111 not either good or enough examples for certain categories (e.g., in case of dataset imbalance) [27]. On
112 the other hand, unsupervised Sentiment Analysis approaches usually rely on semantic resources like
113 lexicons, where words are assigned to scores for reflecting words relevance for target categories to infer
114 sentiments and emotions of the input data [28–30]. Both supervised and unsupervised approaches are
115 largely explored in literature for Sentiment Analysis tasks, which include Sentiment Analysis polarity
116 detection (i.e., identifying whether a certain text is either positive or negative) [31], figurative-language
117 uncovering (understanding if the input text if figurative or objective) [23,32], aspect-based polarity
118 detection (e.g., assigning sentiment polarity to features of a certain topic such as the screen of an

4 <https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/>

5 <https://github.com/danilo-dessi/toxicity>

119 iPhone) [33,34], sentiment scores prediction (e.g., identifying a continuous number in [-1,1] to a certain
120 topic or text) [4], and so on.

121 However, only recently, these methodologies have been explored for toxicity detection [35],
122 although the need to monitor online communications to identify toxicity and make the communications
123 safe and respectful is an old and still open issue. Hence, the gap between the current methodologies
124 and their potential use within toxicity detection remains an open challenge. Therefore, dealing with
125 toxicity raises new challenges and research opportunities where deep learning-based approaches for
126 Sentiment Analysis can have a relevant role in making advancements for the identification of toxicity
127 levels.

128 Also, Semantic Web technologies are being used within Sentiment Analysis tasks. It has been
129 proved that they bring several benefits leading to higher accuracy [36]. For example, the use of
130 sentiment-based technologies to detect toxicity is investigated in [37]. However, the use of word
131 embedding representation is not taken into account. A work worth noting is [23], where authors
132 analysed the problem of figurative language detection in social media. More in detail, they focused
133 on the use of semantic features extracted with Framester for identifying irony and sarcasm. Semantic
134 features have been extracted to enrich the representation of input tweets with event information using
135 frames and word senses in addition to lexical units. One more example of an unsupervised method
136 that exploits Semantic Web technologies is represented by Sentilo [38,39]. Given a statement expressing
137 an opinion, Sentilo recognizes its holder, detects its related topics and subtopics, links them to relevant
138 situations and events referred to by it, and evaluates the sentiment expressed on each topic/subtopic.
139 Moreover, Sentilo is domain-independent and relies on a novel lexical resource, which enables a proper
140 propagation of the sentiment scores from topics to subtopics. Its output is represented as an RDF graph
141 and, where applicable, it resolves holders' and topics' identity on Linked Data.

142 Recently, authors in [35] discussed the problem of toxicity detection and proved that context
143 can both amplify or mitigate the perceived toxicity of posts. Besides, they found out no evidence
144 that context actually improves the performance of toxicity classifiers. In another work [40] authors
145 presented an interactive tool for auditing toxicity detection models by visualizing explanations for
146 predictions and providing alternative wordings for detected toxic speech. In particular, they displayed
147 the attention of toxicity detection models on user input, providing suggestions on how to replace
148 sensitive text with less toxic words.

149 Others, [41], tackled the problem of identifying disguised offensive language, such as adversarial
150 attacks that avoid known toxic patterns and lexicons. To do that, they proposed a framework to fortify
151 existing toxic speech detectors without a large labeled corpus of veiled toxicity. In particular, they
152 augmented the toxic speech detector's training data with new discovered offensive examples.

153 Deep learning technologies have been leveraged by authors in [42] to tackle the problem of toxic
154 comments detection. More in details, the authors introduced two state-of-the-art neural network
155 architectures and demonstrate how to employ a contextual language representation model.

156 One more work that deals with a sentiment toxicity detection problem is [7], where authors adopt
157 both pre-trained word embeddings and close-domain word embeddings previously trained on a large
158 dataset of users' comments [43]. However, their approach is based on a Logistic Regression (LR)
159 classifier and does not use state-of-the-art deep learning technologies. Well established methodologies
160 (e.g., k-nearest neighbors (kNN), Naive Bayes (NB), Support Vector Machines (SVM), etc.) are today
161 outperformed for the same tasks by CNN-based models by [44].

162 One more work for toxicity detection is proposed by authors in [45] and it lies within the context
163 of multiplayer online games. There, social interactions are an essential feature for a growing number
164 of players worldwide. This interaction might bring undesired and unintended behavior especially if
165 the game is designed to be highly competitive. They defined toxicity as the use of profane language by
166 one player to insult or humiliate another player in the same team. Given the specific domain, the use of
167 bad words is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for toxicity as they can be used to curse without
168 the intent to offend anyone. Authors looked at the 100 most frequently used n-grams for n=1,2,3,4

169 and manually determined which of them are toxic or not. With such training data they use a SVM
170 to predict the odds of winning for each team to observers based on their communication, while the
171 match is still going.

172 Another work that embraces both deep learning and word embeddings for toxicity detection
173 is reported in [1], where FastText⁶ pre-trained embeddings are used to feed four different deep
174 learning models based on CNN, Long Short Term Memory (LSTM), and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)
175 layers. However, the experiments show weak results probably due to the class imbalance of classes.
176 Conversely, in this work deep learning models by using a balanced dataset are trained, considering one
177 toxicity class at a time, and trying to better represent the input texts by using word embeddings tuned
178 to the target domain. More precisely, in one set of experiments, domain generated word embeddings
179 are created through mimicking techniques; this allows to face slang, misspellings, or obfuscated
180 contents not represented within pre-trained word embedding representations [46,47]. Besides the
181 Word2Vec embeddings, state-of-the-art word embeddings called BERT [15,48,49] are used to tune the
182 vectors to the context where words are used.

183 3. Problem Formulation

The problem faced in this paper is a multi-class multi-label classification problem. We turned it into several binary single-label classification problems. More precisely, given a textual comment c and a toxicity facet t , the approach is aimed to build a deep learning model

$$\gamma : (c, t) \rightarrow l$$

184 where l is a binary label that can only assume values in $\{0, 1\}$ and indicates if the toxicity t is present
185 in c (i.e., l takes the value 1) or not (i.e., l takes the value 0). Therefore, with such an approach, an
186 independent binary classifier for each toxicity label is trained. Given an unseen sample, each binary
187 classifier predicts whether that underlying toxicity is present or not in the sample. The combined
188 model then predicts all the labels for this sample for which the respective classifier predicts a positive
189 result. Although this method of dividing the task into multiple binary tasks may resemble superficially
190 the one-vs-all and one-vs-rest methods for multi-class classification, it is essentially different from
191 them because a single binary classifier deals with a single label without any regard to other labels
192 whatsoever. This means that each binary classification task we formulated does not benefit from
193 the information of the other labels at training time. However, this mapping is straightforward and
194 does not change the semantic of the input problem [50]. By building these models for various t , the
195 performances of the proposed solutions are evaluated with the goal of finding which combination of
196 the deep learning layers and word embeddings can better capture the text peculiarities for toxicity
197 detection.

198 4. The Proposed Approach

199 In this section we will describe the deep learning models and word embedding representations
200 for representing the text expressing the various toxicity categories.

201 4.1. Preprocessing

202 Text preprocessing techniques such as stop words and punctuation removal, lemmatization,
203 stemming, matching words with a dictionary to correct grammar, removing words containing
204 alpha-numeric characters, and so on, are common practices when Machine Learning algorithms
205 are applied [51,52], and text representation is generated as a result of different feature engineering
206 processes. However, with the introduction of deep learning approaches, these techniques have not

⁶ <https://fasttext.cc/docs/en/english-vectors.html>




Figure 1. The deep learning models. (a) Dense (b) CNN (c) LSTM (d) Bidirectional LSTM. The output shape of the employed layers is indicated within the parenthesis.

207 shown promising results. The reason is that neural networks learn from any element found within the
208 text because each token contributes to the sentence semantics. Therefore, although certain terms might
209 be included in existing stop word lists, they are maintained because they can enrich the semantics of
210 text content and improve the performance of the deep learning model [1]. Hence, as suggested by
211 authors in [1], all the above mentioned preprocessing steps are ignored; only the conversion of texts in
212 lower case is performed. Afterward, the whole set of input text is ready to feed a deep learning model.
213 More precisely, imagine to have a toxicity target class t and a set of pairs $P = \{(c_0, l_0), \dots, (c_n, l_n)\}$,
214 where c_i is a textual comment and l_0 is a binary label that can only take either the value 0 if the comment
215 c_i does not include the toxicity t or 1 if the comment c_i expresses some level of toxicity t . From the set P ,
216 the set $P' = \{(c'_0, l_0), \dots, (c'_n, l_n)\}$ is derived, where each comment c'_i is an integer-encoded comment
217 of the original c_i . In details, let W be the list of all the words belonging to all textual comments, and
218 WS the set of all the words in W without duplicates (i.e., WS has only one occurrence for each input
219 word, whereas W can contain multiple occurrences of the same element). Then, two functions θ and ϕ ,
220 which map the elements in W and WS to unique integer values, respectively, are built. For example,
221 consider the sentence *you both shut up or you both die* and imagine to have the toy functions θ_{toy} and
222 ϕ_{toy} . The function θ_{toy} maps “you” to “7”, “both” to “43”, “shut” to “22”, “up” to “76”, “or” to “10”,
223 “you” to “3”, “both” to “41”, and “die” to “50”. The function ϕ_{toy} maps “you” to “7”, “both” to “43”,
224 “shut” to “22”, “up” to “76”, “or” to “10”, and “die” to “50”. Then the integer-encoded sentence
225 is [7, 43, 22, 76, 10, 3, 41, 50] by applying θ_{toy} , and [7, 43, 22, 76, 7, 43, 10, 50] by using ϕ_{toy} . The reader
226 notices that by using θ_{toy} the words “you” and “both” are mapped to different integers. Within our
227 approach, the function θ is used for *BERT* word embeddings, whereas the function ϕ is used to encode
228 the input text when *Word2Vec* word embeddings are employed.

229 4.2. Deep Learning Models

230 The designed deep learning model schemes are shown in Figure 1. In particular, we illustrate four
231 deep learning models based on *Dense*, *CNN*, and *LSTM* layers available within the Keras framework⁷.
232 All the models present the same number of layers. It is worth to note that the input and the output
233 layers among the models are the same to better compare their performances considering only the type
234 of neural network that they adopt. More precisely, the input layer is an *Embedding* layer, which has the
235 goal of mapping the words of the input text to the underlying word embeddings. The last layer is a
236 *Dense* layer that maps the intermediate results of the models in a single label that can only take the
237 values 0 and 1. For doing so, it uses the *sigmoid* activation function to compute a probability that can
238 be easily used to obtain the correct label value. In the next paragraphs we will give more details about
239 the deep learning layers.

240 The literature already showed [53] that deep learning methods trained with word embeddings
241 outperform those trained with tf-idf features. Therefore, we did not include the latter in our analysis
242 as we believe that they would not add additional value to the current evaluation.

243 4.2.1. Dense Model

244 The first model is depicted in Figure 1(a). It is composed of two inner *Dense* layers with 128 and
245 64 neurons. They are densely-connected layers able to reduce the input size of hundred and thousands
246 of nodes to a few nodes whose weights can be used to predict the final class of the input.

247 4.2.2. CNN Model

248 The CNN model depicted in Figure 1(b) is based on inner CNN layers. These layers perform
249 filtering operations to detect meaningful features of textual input for the target toxicity facet. Filters

⁷ <https://keras.io/>

250 can be envisioned as kernels that slide on the vector representation and perform the same operations
251 on each element until all the vectors have been covered. Two kernels of size 10 for the first layer,
252 and size 5 for the second layer are used. For these layers, the same number of neurons previously
253 introduced for the *Dense* layers is used to better compare the model performances.

254 4.2.3. LSTM Model

255 The model depicted in Figure 1(c) exploits the LSTM layers to perform a binary classification of
256 the input text. LSTMs are an extended version of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) and are designed
257 to work on sequences. They use memory blocks to hold the state of the computation which makes it
258 possible to learn temporal dependencies of data, binding the chunks of data that are currently being
259 processed with the chunks of data already processed. This allows to infer semantic patterns that
260 describe the history of the input data, solving the problem of common RNN whose results mostly
261 depend on the last seen data fed into the model, smoothing the relevance of data previously processed.

262 4.2.4. Bidirectional LSTM

263 The last model, shown in Figure 1(d), is an evolution of the LSTM model. It uses bidirectional
264 LSTM layers to find patterns that can be discovered by exploring the history of the input data in both
265 forward and backward directions. The idea of this kind of network consists of presenting the training
266 data forwards and backward to the two bidirectional LSTM hidden layers whose results are then
267 combined by a common output layer.

268 4.3. Word Embeddings Representations

269 In this section, the word embedding representations used to model the syntactic and semantic
270 properties of the words in vectors of real numbers are introduced. Within this work, the employed
271 word embedding representations are *Word2Vec* [13,14] and BERT [15]. We chose the most common
272 sizes for the embeddings, i.e., 300 for *Word2Vec* embeddings and 1024 for BERT word embeddings.

273 4.3.1. Word2Vec

274 The *Word2Vec* [13,14] word embedding generator aims to detect the meaning and semantic
275 relations among the words by investigating the co-occurrence of words in documents within a given
276 corpus. The idea behind this algorithm is to model the context of words by exploiting Machine
277 Learning and statistics and come up with a vector representation for each word within the corpus.
278 The resulting word vector representations allow the recognition of relatedness between words. For
279 example, the verbs *capture* and *catch*, which are syntactically different but share common meaning and
280 present analogous co-occurring words, are associated to similar vectors. A *Word2Vec* model can be
281 trained by using either the Continuous Bag-Of-Words (CBOW) or the Skip-gram algorithm. Within our
282 work, the Skip-gram algorithm is adopted because from a preliminary evaluation it obtained higher
283 performances. In details, the following *Word2Vec* word embeddings are used:

- 284 • *Pre-trained*. Pre-trained word embeddings released by Google and available online⁸. They are
285 trained on the Google news dataset and contain more than 1 billion words. However, their
286 use can be limited by words that could be misspelled (e.g., words with orthographic errors) or
287 domain-dependent words within the input data. These words are commonly referred to as Out
288 Of Vocabulary (OOV) words.
- 289 • *Domain-trained*. Domain-trained word embeddings are trained on [the original unbalanced dataset](#)
290 [\(we merged the training and the test set\) provided by the Kaggle challenge](#). [The reader notices](#)
291 [that we computed the domain-trained embeddings on the new training sets only \(at each iteration](#)

⁸ <https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/>

of the 10-fold cross-validation procedure) of our evaluation strategy. Training the embeddings on the domain data solves the problem of OOV words because for each word it is possible to associate a vector. However, words that are not frequent within our data might have a vector that does not fully and correctly represent words' semantics. The Skip-gram *Word2Vec* algorithm available within the *gensim*⁹ library is used. The model is trained using 20 epochs.

- *Mimicked*. Mimicked word embeddings are embeddings of OOV words that are not present within the original model used to represent the text data, but are inferred by exploiting syntactic similarities of words that are in the originally considered vocabulary. More in details, we used the algorithm proposed by [47], which is based on an RNN and works at character level. Words within an original vector model representation are firstly encoded by sequences of characters, and characters are associated with new vector representations. Then, by using a BiLSTM network, an OOV word w is associated to a new word embedding e . To create word embeddings for the OOV words we used the default input dataset, the hyperparameters mentioned in [47] and the pre-trained *Word2Vec* Google embeddings.

4.3.2. BERT

The BERT word embeddings model was introduced in late 2018 by authors in [15]. It is a novel model of pre-trained language representations that allows the tuning of word vector representations to the meaning that the word has in a given context, overcoming ambiguity issues of words. One of the famous examples is usually reported with the word *bank*. Consider the two sentences "The man was accused of robbing a bank" and "The man went fishing by the bank of the river". The introduced word embedding models describe the word *bank* with the same word embedding, i.e., they express all the possible meanings with the same vector, and, therefore, cannot disambiguate the word senses based on the surrounding context. On the other hand, BERT produces two different word embeddings, coming up with more accurate representations for the two different meanings. For doing so, BERT computes context-tuned word embeddings resulting in more accurate representations which might lead to better model performances. In this work, the *bert_24_1024_16* BERT model trained on *book_corpus_wiki_en_cased* is employed and fine-tuned by using the *bert_embedding*¹⁰ library.

4.3.3. Word Embeddings Preparation

To load word embeddings into a deep learning model, they have to be organized into a matrix M . For *Word2Vec* word embeddings, the set WS of words in the input data is used to build M as a matrix of size $(|WS|, 300)$, where each row with index $\phi(w) \mid w \in WS$ (i.e., $row_{\phi(w)}$) contains the word embedding of the word w . If a word w is not present in the *Word2Vec* selected resource (e.g., when only pre-trained word embeddings are used), then $row_{\phi(w)}$ is a row with all its entries set to 0. Similarly, when the *BERT* embeddings are employed, the matrix M size is $(|W|, 1024)$, where each row with index $\theta(w) \mid w \in W$ (i.e., $row_{\theta(w)}$) contains the word embedding of the word w . The generated matrix M is loaded into the *Embedding* layer of the employed deep learning model to map the encoded textual comments to the correct word embeddings.

5. Experimental study

In this section we describe the dataset used to perform our experiments, the obtained results, and the related discussion. All the experiments are run by using a 10-fold cross-validation setup. Each model is trained with batches of size 128. The model is configured to train at most with 20 epochs. However, an early stopping method with patience of 5 epochs and a delta of 0.05 that monitors the accuracy of the model are embedded within the training stage. The loss function used to train the

⁹ <https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/>

¹⁰ <https://pypi.org/project/bert-embedding/>

Table 1. Number of textual comments for each class.

Toxicity class	Number of comments	Percentage	Balanced dataset size
<i>No toxic</i>	201,081	89.95%	-
<i>toxic</i>	21,384	9.57%	42,768
<i>severe toxic</i>	1,962	0.88%	3,924
<i>obscene</i>	12,140	5.43%	24,280
<i>threat</i>	689	0.31%	1,378
<i>insult</i>	11,304	5.06%	22,608
<i>identity hate</i>	2,117	0.95%	4,234

models is the *binary crossentropy* and the used optimizer is *rmsprop* with the default learning rate 0.001 provided by the used library. The domain-trained word embeddings have been computed on the training sets only at each iteration of the 10-fold cross-validation procedure. All the other parameters have been empirically set on the basis of the models performance and previous experiences in past works [4,46]. The experiments have been carried out on a Titan X GPU mounted on a server with 16 GB of RAM memory.

5.1. The Dataset

To perform our analysis we employed the dataset released by a Kaggle competition¹¹. The dataset is collected from Wikipedia comments that have been manually labeled into 6 different toxicity classes. It consists of training and test files. However, the original split is not kept in order to apply the proposed approach and balance the data. The dataset is composed of more than 200k comments and presents annotations for six different toxicity classes and one more class when no toxicity is present. Table 1 reports the number of comments and the related percentage concerning the original dataset (second and third columns) belonging to each of the seven resulting classes. The first row includes the comments that do not present toxicity, then from the second row on, the number of comments for each toxicity class (*toxic*, *severetoxic*, *obscene*, *threat*, *insult*, *identityhate*) are reported. Besides, from Table 1 it is worth to note that the dataset is strongly unbalanced as nearly 90% of the overall comments do not present toxicity. Therefore, as mentioned early in the paper, the training of a model is biased because the model does not have a sufficient number of examples of the minority class to correctly identify a pattern. A random model that always predicts the majority class can obtain better performances although it is not be able to recognize elements that should belong to the minority class. Hence, having a balanced dataset is a common procedure in several classification tasks [54] and allows understanding better the performances of a model [12]. It follows that for each toxicity class we built a dataset where the number of positive examples (i.e., comments that present the target toxicity class) and the number of negative examples (i.e., comments that do not present that target toxicity class) are the same. The size of the created datasets for each class are reported in Table 1 under the *Balanced dataset size* column. The reader notices that, for a certain toxicity class, the negative examples are chosen among all the other classes including the *No toxic* comments.

5.2. Baselines

For evaluation purposes, the deep learning models have been compared to a certain number of baselines. These are classical Machine Learning classifiers that are usually employed with the *tf-idf* to

¹¹ <https://www.kaggle.com/>

366 represent textual resources [51]. More precisely, the deep learning models are compared against the
 367 following classifiers:

- 368 • **Decision Tree (DT)**. The Decision Tree algorithm builds a model by learning decision rules that
 369 when applied to the input features can correctly predict the target class. The model has a root
 370 node that represents the whole set of input data. This node is subsequently split into its children
 371 by applying a given rule. The process is then applied to its children recursively as long as there
 372 are nodes that can be split.
- 373 • **Random Forest (RF)**. This method adopts more DTs applied on different samples of the input
 374 data and uses a majority voting strategy to predict the output classes. The strength of this
 375 algorithm is that each DT is individually trained; therefore, overfitting and errors due to biases
 376 are limited. We adopted a classifier that made use of 100 DTs estimators.
- 377 • **Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)**. This is a neural network that is composed of a single layer of
 378 nodes. In our experiment, we used a layer with 100 nodes.

379 For these classical Machine Learning methods employed as baselines the adoption of just word
 380 embeddings is not promising and this has already been shown in literature [55]. In particular, when
 381 employing word embeddings for classical Machine Learning methods, they should be processed by
 382 operations such as the average or the sum before being fed to a given classifier. This causes loss of
 383 syntactic and semantic information expressed by the embeddings of each word.

384 To develop the algorithms above we employed the *scikit-learn*¹² library.

385 Additionally, the area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve (ROC-AUC) is
 386 also reported in Table 2 in order to understand the performance of our model with respect to the best
 387 models proposed for the challenge’s task.

Table 2. ROC-AUC values of our deep learning models on each binary classification and average for each model.

Learning Model	Word Embeddings	Toxic	Severe Toxic	Obscene	Threat	Identity Hate	Insult	Average
Deep Model Dense	pre-trained	0.921	0.968	0.936	0.977	0.944	0.933	0.947
	domain-trained	0.915	0.959	0.928	0.968	0.934	0.924	0.938
	mimicked	0.922	0.969	0.938	0.981	0.941	0.931	0.947
	bert	0.898	0.964	0.904	0.945	0.924	0.906	0.924
Deep Model CNN	pre-trained	0.905	0.964	0.924	0.969	0.934	0.915	0.935
	domain-trained	0.895	0.950	0.857	0.957	0.909	0.903	0.912
	mimicked	0.906	0.961	0.923	0.974	0.935	0.914	0.936
	bert	0.881	0.952	0.894	0.909	0.892	0.895	0.904
Deep Model LSTM	pre-trained	0.970	0.982	0.980	0.983	0.968	0.976	0.977
	domain-trained	0.963	0.980	0.977	0.983	0.968	0.970	0.974
	mimicked	0.971	0.983	0.977	0.985	0.970	0.977	0.977
	bert	0.930	0.974	0.940	0.956	0.950	0.940	0.948
Deep Model Bidirectional LSTM	pre-trained	0.969	0.981	0.973	0.984	0.967	0.975	0.975
	domain-trained	0.963	0.980	0.977	0.984	0.964	0.970	0.973
	mimicked	0.969	0.963	0.980	0.988	0.970	0.976	0.974
	bert	0.930	0.970	0.939	0.951	0.947	0.941	0.946

¹² <https://scikit-learn.org/stable/index.html>

Table 3. Precision (p), recall (r), and f-measure (f) related to the binary classification for each toxicity class using the balanced dataset.

Learning Model	Word Embeddings	Toxic			Severe Toxic			Obscene		
		p	r	f	p	r	f	p	r	f
Decision Trees	tf-idf	0.859	0.855	0.857	0.847	0.947	0.894	0.926	0.929	0.928
Random Forests	tf-idf	0.860	0.856	0.858	0.888	0.940	0.913	0.945	0.834	0.913
MLP	tf-idf	0.849	0.857	0.853	0.913	0.918	0.915	0.884	0.895	0.889
Deep Model Dense	pre-trained	0.863	0.856	0.858	0.923	0.910	0.916	0.886	0.867	0.876
	domain-trained	0.855	0.848	0.851	0.893	0.910	0.899	0.874	0.863	0.867
	mimicked	0.868	0.844	0.855	0.926	0.914	0.919	0.880	0.877	0.878
	bert	0.828	0.817	0.822	0.912	0.917	0.913	0.844	0.821	0.832
Deep Model CNN	pre-trained	0.848	0.849	0.848	0.910	0.911	0.909	0.863	0.861	0.861
	domain-trained	0.846	0.841	0.842	0.903	0.875	0.888	0.858	0.849	0.853
	mimicked	0.836	0.865	0.850	0.886	0.919	0.901	0.856	0.870	0.862
	bert	0.801	0.812	0.805	0.899	0.911	0.904	0.819	0.832	0.825
Deep Model LSTM	pre-trained	0.914	0.915	0.914	0.944	0.962	0.953	0.927	0.949	0.938
	domain-trained	0.903	0.916	0.909	0.947	0.948	0.947	0.929	0.944	0.936
	mimicked	0.895	0.938	0.916	0.941	0.966	0.953	0.928	0.938	0.932
	bert	0.866	0.851	0.858	0.927	0.932	0.929	0.889	0.861	0.875
Deep Model Bidirectional LSTM	pre-trained	0.906	0.923	0.914	0.936	0.959	0.947	0.963	0.854	0.905
	domain-trained	0.905	0.915	0.910	0.948	0.962	0.955	0.941	0.933	0.937
	mimicked	0.910	0.921	0.915	0.939	0.963	0.951	0.929	0.945	0.937
	bert	0.875	0.841	0.856	0.933	0.941	0.937	0.892	0.852	0.871

Learning Model	Word Embeddings	Threat			Identity Hate			Insult		
		p	r	f	p	r	f	p	r	f
Decision Trees	tf-idf	0.917	0.891	0.903	0.819	0.927	0.869	0.887	0.891	0.889
Random Forests	tf-idf	0.954	0.897	0.924	0.847	0.911	0.877	0.929	0.851	0.888
MLP	tf-idf	0.914	0.916	0.913	0.889	0.897	0.893	0.871	0.880	0.876
Deep Model Dense	pre-trained	0.934	0.930	0.931	0.897	0.865	0.879	0.872	0.865	0.869
	domain-trained	0.913	0.918	0.914	0.858	0.877	0.866	0.876	0.846	0.860
	mimicked	0.933	0.932	0.931	0.881	0.882	0.880	0.873	0.857	0.863
	bert	0.867	0.891	0.877	0.874	0.865	0.855	0.841	0.827	0.834
Deep Model CNN	pre-trained	0.932	0.870	0.891	0.872	0.863	0.867	0.842	0.862	0.851
	domain-trained	0.898	0.899	0.898	0.823	0.868	0.842	0.874	0.816	0.843
	mimicked	0.927	0.918	0.922	0.860	0.879	0.869	0.847	0.849	0.847
	bert	0.842	0.872	0.849	0.824	0.842	0.832	0.831	0.821	0.826
Deep Model LSTM	pre-trained	0.932	0.967	0.948	0.907	0.909	0.906	0.918	0.939	0.928
	domain-trained	0.949	0.951	0.950	0.913	0.925	0.918	0.919	0.930	0.924
	mimicked	0.953	0.962	0.957	0.887	0.946	0.914	0.916	0.948	0.931
	bert	0.916	0.899	0.907	0.880	0.895	0.886	0.874	0.870	0.872
Deep Model Bidirectional LSTM	pre-trained	0.946	0.961	0.952	0.905	0.921	0.912	0.918	0.931	0.924
	domain-trained	0.949	0.949	0.949	0.904	0.935	0.919	0.918	0.938	0.927
	mimicked	0.941	0.944	0.940	0.902	0.934	0.916	0.920	0.935	0.927
	bert	0.913	0.900	0.905	0.900	0.857	0.874	0.889	0.866	0.877

388 5.3. Results and Discussion

389 In this section, we discuss the results of the experiments we have carried. They are reported
 390 in Tables 2 and 3 in terms of ROC-AUC, precision, recall, and f-measure scores (for computing the
 391 ROC-AUC, the true positive rates and false positive rates are computed accordingly to Equations (1)
 392 and (2); precision, recall and f-measure are computed according to Equations (3), (4), and (5)). In
 393 the equations, TP (true positives) is the number of comments with the target toxicity class correctly
 394 guessed by the model, FP (false positives) is the number of comments erroneously associated to a
 395 target toxicity class, TN (true negatives) is the number of comments that the classifier correctly does not
 396 classify for a target class, and FN (false negatives) is the number of comments erroneously classified
 397 with a class different than the target class.

$$\text{True positive rate} = \frac{TN}{TN + FP} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{False positive rate} = \frac{FP}{FP + TN} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Precision } (p) = \frac{TP}{TP + FP} \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Recall } (r) = \frac{TP}{TP + FN} \quad (4)$$

$$F - \text{measure } (f) = 2 \cdot \frac{P \cdot R}{P + R} \quad (5)$$

398 Results depicted in Table 3 show how the deep learning models perform against the baselines
 399 (classical Machine Learning approaches). For each deep learning model, the performance of the model
 400 in combination with the embedding representations is illustrated as well.

401 5.4. Comparison with the Kaggle Challenge

402 The results indicated in Table 2 report the ROC-AUC values of our deep learning approaches for
 403 each toxicity class and the average over all the classes. The reader notices that it is not the purpose of
 404 this paper to compete with the other participants of the Kaggle challenge where the data have been
 405 extracted and the evaluation has been reported using the ROC-AUC. The best three approaches of the
 406 challenge were *Toxic Crusaders*, *neongen & Computer says no*, and *Adversarial Autoencoder*, which reported
 407 a ROC-AUC value of 0.989, 0.988, and 0.988, respectively. The challenge task was to test any proposed
 408 approach on a highly unbalanced dataset. In this paper we wanted to study how deep learning
 409 methods and classical Machine Learning approaches (using tf-idf and word embeddings) perform on
 410 the toxicity problem without any bias (unbalanceness of the data). Moreover, it has been proved that
 411 optimizing a method for the ROC-AUC does not guarantee the optimization on the precision-recall
 412 curve [56]. This is why we included Table 3 with precision, recall and f-measure metrics computed on
 413 the preprocessed balanced dataset. There are several heuristics and tuning that can be done in presence
 414 of unbalanced datasets to help achieving high values of ROC-AUC. Those could not be performed by
 415 us since we used a balanced version of the original dataset.

416 5.4.1. Baseline Comparison

417 The results indicate that *Dense*- and *CNN*-based models are not much better than the baseline
 418 methods. Actually, in some cases, they are outperformed. For example, considering the toxicity
 419 classes *obscene* and *insult*, it is possible to observe that the f-measure computed on the baseline
 420 predictions is higher than the one obtained by *Dense*- and *CNN*-based models. On the other hand,
 421 *LSTM*-based models are able to outperform the baseline methods with a minimum improvement in

422 terms of f-measure of 0.01, i.e., in percentage 1% (see *obscene* class), and a maximum of 0.058, i.e.,
423 in percentage 5.8% (see *toxic* class). These results are similar, and sometimes still more noticeable
424 when the *Bidirectional LSTM* layers are employed. Moreover, considering that by using the balanced
425 dataset every classifier is able to obtain a f-measure always higher than 0.8, the improvements can be
426 considered remarkable. The only drawback is related to the computational time needed to train the
427 deep learning model. Nevertheless, the training time is not reported since i) it is out of the scope of
428 this study ii) with modern GPUs it is feasible to train complex deep learning models iii) the training
429 step must be executed only once, and iv) the computational time needed for the prediction step does
430 not depend on the underlying model used for the training step.

431 5.4.2. Dense-based Model

432 For the task of toxicity detection the *Dense*-based model never obtains the best performances. In
433 most of the cases, the best results with this model are obtained with the *mimicked* word embeddings
434 where for four out of six classes the achieved f-measure score is the highest. The *pre-trained* word
435 embeddings obtain high performances too, especially for classes such as *Toxic*, *Threat* (in this case
436 the f-measure is very close to the case when using *mimicked*), and *Insult*. The use of *domain-trained*
437 word embeddings never meets high scores, except when the *precision* is considered for the *Insult* class.
438 Similarly, *BERT* word embeddings performances are the worst.

439 5.4.3. CNN-based Model

440 Using the *CNN*-based model the results do not improve further with respect to the *Dense*-based
441 model. In some cases, the performances of the model are even lower. With this model, the best results
442 are obtained by employing the *mimicked* word embeddings for the toxicity classes *Toxic*, *Obscene*, *Threat*,
443 and *Identity Hate*. For the other toxicity classes, the best results are obtained using the *pre-trained* word
444 embeddings. *Domain-trained* and *BERT* embeddings are not able to properly represent the domain
445 knowledge for the *CNN* model, thus the results are poor.

446 5.4.4. LSTM-based Model

447 The *LSTM* model outperforms both *Dense* and *CNN*-based models, proving its suitability to detect
448 patterns for toxic detection. As previously mentioned, *mimicked* word embeddings are employed
449 for the deep learning model to learn and uncover toxicity from the text comments. *Pre-trained* and
450 *Domain-trained* word embeddings obtain good performances, and their results are not far from the
451 model using the *mimicked* word embeddings. On the other hand, once again *BERT* is not a good
452 representation for the *LSTM* model. Except for *BERT*, the three other word embeddings adopted with
453 the *LSTM* model outperform the baseline methods for almost each toxicity level.

454 5.4.5. BiLSTM-based Model

455 Although the higher complexity of the employed layers, the results of the *BiLSTM* (Bidirectional
456 *LSTM*) model are similar to those obtained by the *LSTM* model. In some cases, the *BiLSTM* is able to
457 outperform the *LSTM*, in others it is not. Moreover, it differs from the other models because its best
458 performances for many classes are obtained using the *domain-trained* word embeddings. The *pre-trained*
459 and *mimicked* word embeddings continued to show good ability to represent domain knowledge, and
460 *BERT* embeddings confirm to be the last choice for the task of toxicity detection. Similarly to the *LSTM*
461 model, except using *BERT*, the model outperforms the baselines in almost each toxicity class.

462 5.4.6. Overall evaluation of the deep learning models

463 The use of deep learning for the task of toxicity detection has shown good performances in all the
464 toxicity classes. Also, it turns out that although the small size of datasets employed for certain classes,
465 they are able to detect patterns that allow to correctly perform the classification. More in details, the

466 results suggest that the *Dense* and *CNN* models perform well since their f-measure is always higher
467 than 0.8 but, for the toxicity detection task, they are outperformed by the *LSTM* and *BiLSTM* models,
468 which obtain a f-measure higher than 0.9 in most of the cases. Results are comparable among the
469 *LSTM* and *BiLSTM* models. However, because *BiLSTM*-based models need higher computational
470 time to be trained than *LSTM* models, the latter are slightly preferred. It is worth to mention that the
471 current models are trained without the context that was surrounding the comments in the Wikipedia
472 pages (where the dataset has been originally collected) and, therefore, they might lack the necessary
473 information to predict the correct class. One more obstacle might be also due to the presence of
474 figurative language within the comments, which might change the meaning of the sentences, thus
475 misleading the models. For example, a frequent sentence like *I am going to kill you* pronounced after a
476 mistake or an undesired change in the Wikipedia pages does not necessarily convey a threat or hate
477 emotion but it may be simply a joke.

478 5.4.7. Overall evaluation of word embeddings

479 From the results, it is noticeable that the *Word2Vec* algorithm is a good choice to represent textual
480 resources to be parsed with deep learning models. Results suggest that *mimicked* word embeddings are
481 the best choice because they enclose the knowledge of *pre-trained* word embeddings that have been
482 built on a large dataset and do not suffer from the OOV words problem [46]. *Domain-trained* word
483 embeddings obtain good results but, for most of the cases, they are outperformed. This may depend
484 on the fact that the resources employed to train these embeddings are not very large and, besides, there
485 are not a sufficient number of examples of toxicity due to the unbalanced number of toxic comments
486 in the input dataset (i.e., more than 200k comments do not present toxicity, the reader can see Table 1).

487 Surprisingly, *BERT* embeddings perform badly for the task of toxicity detection although they
488 are currently the state-of-the-art word embedding representations. A possible motivation behind
489 this finding is that assigning a different embedding to the same word is somehow misleading to the
490 training of the deep learning models. More precisely, the tuning step performed to generate the *BERT*
491 embeddings on our data is not able to capture the context of the words due to the length of some input
492 textual comments and to the typos and incorrect grammar often present within them, thus transferring
493 possible erroneous information to our deep learning models. One more reason might be due to the
494 lack of the surrounding context of the comments; it might have limited the fine-tuning of the model,
495 therefore leading the semantics of words to be captured badly. This fact is worth to be investigated,
496 and a close analysis to this problem is required.

497 6. Conclusion and Future Work

498 In this paper, we presented an assessment of various deep learning models fed by various word
499 embedding representations to detect toxicity within textual comments. From the obtained results
500 we can definitely state that toxicity can be identified by machine and deep learning approaches fed
501 with syntactic and semantic information extracted from the text. We show how *LSTM*-based model is
502 the first choice among the experimented models to detect toxicity. We also show how various word
503 embeddings may represent the domain knowledge in a variety of ways, and an unique model for all
504 cases might be insufficient. In particular, the results are encouraging when using mimicking techniques
505 to deal with OOV words where there are not many examples to build significant domain-dependent
506 word embeddings. As future works, we plan to perform a deeper assessment of deep learning models
507 by using and combining different layers, to better detect patterns and on real scenarios where classes
508 may be unbalanced as well. Moreover, we would like to investigate other contextualized word
509 embedding representations such as *ELMO* [57] for the toxicity detection task. An analysis of the
510 proposed approaches on which configuration, parameter settings and heuristic may be added to tackle
511 the same problem but in presence of highly unbalanced datasets is definitely a research direction we
512 would like to investigate as well. Finally, we would like to investigate the impact of using different
513 embeddings for the same word since it might be the cause of failure of *BERT* embeddings in our

514 experiments. We also think that an ensemble strategy of the proposed approaches should result in
515 better overall performances and are then investigating this direction as well.

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519 Abbreviations

520 The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:

521	AUC	Area under the curve
	BERT	Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers
	BiLSTM	Bidirectional Long-Short Term Memory
	CBOW	Continuous Bag-Of-Words
	CNN	Convolutional Neural Network
	DT	Decision Tree
	ELMO	Embeddings from Language Models
	GPU	Graphics Processing Unit
	GRU	Gated Recurrent Unit
	kNN	k-Nearest Neighbors
522	LR	Logistic Regression
	LSTM	Long-Short Term Memory
	MLP	Multi-Layer Perceptron
	NB	Naive Bayes
	NLP	Natural Language Processing
	OOV	Out Of Vocabulary
	RF	Random Forest
	ROC	Receiver Operating Characteristic
	RNN	Recurrent Neural Network
	TF-IDF	Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency
	SVM	Support Vector Machine

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